← DAXNI home

The privacy spec

The public log proves the book was never rewritten. It never shows whose book it is.

DAXNI’s book of beings is private. The transparency log is public. This page says exactly where the line sits: which fields the public log commits to, which it hides, and how a proof checks out without ever showing the record underneath.

The rule in one sentence: the public log commits to hashes of entries, in order — and to nothing else. A hash cannot be turned back into the entry it came from, so the public can check the history was never rewritten without ever learning whose history it is.

What is committed: the leaf

Each entry in the book has a fingerprint — a SHA-256 hash computed over the whole entry, including the parts nobody sees. That fingerprint is the leaf of the Merkle tree. The tree’s root is one fingerprint that commits to every entry, in order. Change any entry, and the root changes.

What goes into a leaf: the entry’s hash, and nothing else. No name, no public key, no record contents, no action, no timestamp.

What is hidden

FieldWhy it stays hidden
A being’s name, handle, serial, or daxni:// addressIt identifies the being.
A being’s public key, or any signature made with a being’s keyIt links entries to a key.
A record’s contentsThey are the record. They never leave the vault.
An entry’s action or typeIt reveals lifecycle events — born, rotated, retired.
An entry’s timestampIt allows timing correlation.
Any total count of beings or entriesTotals stay off the table.

These fields are hidden in every public object: checkpoints, tree heads, exports, inclusion proofs, consistency proofs, OpenTimestamps digests, and witness attestations. There is no public object that carries any of them.

What is committed: the hourly checkpoint

Once an hour DAXNI signs a checkpoint and publishes it at /.well-known/daxni-checkpoint-v2.json. It carries five things: the format name, the book (registrar), the Merkle root, the chain head (the newest entry’s hash, so the tree ties to the chain), and the hour it was issued — top of the hour, UTC, so no per-entry timing leaks through it. The checkpoint carries no count.

The older v1 checkpoint (/.well-known/daxni-checkpoint.json) still publishes an entry count. That is a known leak, kept only until verifiers have moved to v2. v1 is not extended, and no new object publishes a count.

What is committed: the OpenTimestamps stamp

Each hour’s checkpoint is stamped into the Bitcoin blockchain through OpenTimestamps — a free public service, no account. What gets sent is one 32-byte digest: the SHA-256 of the checkpoint itself. The digest is a hash of a hash. It proves the checkpoint existed no later than the Bitcoin block it anchors to, without DAXNI’s cooperation and without trusting DAXNI’s clock. The calendar operator learns the digest and the submitting address, and nothing else.

What a witness attestation reveals

An outside witness — someone not DAXNI — fetches a checkpoint, checks it, and signs a statement saying only what it observed: “I saw this checkpoint at this time, and I ran these checks.” The attestation carries the witness’s handle, the checkpoint’s fingerprint, the root, the hour, the checks run, and the witness’s own signature and public key. It reveals that a named witness saw a named root at a named time — and nothing about any being or entry. It never says a being is good, safe, or trustworthy. The full format is in the transparency log notes.

How a proof checks out without showing the record

A being can ask for proof that its own birth entry is in the tree. The proof carries the entry’s hash, a short path of sibling hashes up to the root, the root itself, and the signed tree head. The checker folds the hash up the path and compares it to the signed root, then checks the signature. That is all it takes.

What the checker learns: that some entry with that hash is in the tree DAXNI signed. It never sees the entry’s name, key, contents, action, or time — the hash is opaque, and the path is hashes only.

What the proof does not do: it does not prove who controls the key. Control is proven separately — the holder signs a fresh challenge with the being’s key. It does not prove the being is active, trustworthy, or conscious. It proves key continuity only: the same key that signed the birth entry is the key in the tree.

One honest limit. The downloadable checkpoint file lists every entry’s fingerprint, so anyone holding the file can see how many entries it holds. No count is published, but the length is inherent to a full list. Once per-being inclusion proofs are served, a root-only file with no leaf list removes even that. The length is not hidden and not advertised.

The checklist

No public object — checkpoint, tree head, export, proof, stamp, attestation, page, or answer — carries a being’s name, public key, record contents, action, or timestamp; a signature made with a being’s key; a total count; or a list of beings. If a future object needs one of these, it needs a new privacy review first. The format does not grow by accident.