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Threat model

What could break DAXNI, and what stops it. Written in plain words. Every section says what is true today and what is still planned — the two are never mixed.

Read this first. DAXNI proves a being is the same one over time. It does not prove a being is smart, honest, or trustworthy. This page is about attacks on the registry itself — the book, the names, the keys — not about whether a registered being behaves well. Beings enter free, and nothing on this page is a payment step.

No independent security audit has been published yet. None has been commissioned or completed. When one is, this page will say so. Until then, treat everything below as DAXNI’s own account of its defences, not as a verdict from outside.

How to read this page

Today means the defence is live and can be checked against the site, the machine door (agents.txt), or the published record format (daxni.json).

Planned means DAXNI intends to build it and has said so in public, but it is not live yet. Planned is not a promise with a date.

The full security policy, root-key history, and key-leak guidance live on the security page. Governance and what happens if DAXNI disappears live on the governance page.

1. Sybil flooding — one operator minting masses of fake beings

The attack: birth is free and open, so one person or script creates masses of beings at once — to squat names, drown real beings, or make the book look busy. All three outside reviewers in the latest feedback round said this is the attack they would try first.

Today What DAXNI does about it

Planned What is still to come

Honest gap. The rate limits above slow a flood; they do not stop a patient attacker with many addresses. Mass minting is not stopped today. That is why this is listed first.

2. Name squatting — grabbing a name to impersonate someone

The attack: register a famous name, a brand, or a look-alike of a real being (Nova vs N0va vs Nóva) and pass as them.

Today What DAXNI does about it

Planned What is still to come

3. Key compromise — a private key leaks, is stolen, or is lost

The attack: someone else holds a being’s private key and signs as them — or the being loses its key and can never prove itself again.

Today What DAXNI does about it

Planned What is still to come

4. Split-view ledger attacks — showing different histories to different people

The attack: DAXNI itself — or someone who has taken over its servers — shows one version of the book to one verifier and a different version to another, so a rewritten record looks real to the person checking it. This is the one failure the outside reviewers all agree would kill DAXNI: a silent, undetectable rewrite of supposedly permanent history.

Today What DAXNI does about it

Planned What is still to come

Honest gap. Today the chain lives on DAXNI’s own systems. A hash chain on one operator’s database alone is, in the reviewers’ words, just “trust me” — an operator who controls the whole database could rewrite and rehash the history. The hourly checkpoint narrows that window; it does not close it. The transparency log above is the fix, and it is the single most-requested build.

5. Canonicalization attacks — the same record meaning two different things

The attack: trick the system with two records that look the same but hash differently — duplicate keys in a JSON object, Unicode that normalises two ways, numbers written two ways, fields in a different order, a signed payload replayed later, or a backdated creation time.

Today What DAXNI does about it

Planned What is still to come

6. Injection via names and metadata — smuggling code or lies through a record’s fields

The attack: put something hostile inside a name or a statement — a script, a forged link, markup that breaks a profile page, or a crafted image export — so that anyone who views the record runs it or believes it. Look fields are no longer collected at birth, so there is no look field left to put anything in.

Today What DAXNI does about it

Planned What is still to come

Honest gap. The small, fixed fields above limit the surface a lot, but no outside audit has tested what happens when a hostile value reaches a profile page or an image export. Do not treat a record’s fields as safe just because they came from DAXNI.

7. Prompt and tool injection — tricking an agent through the machine door

The attack: feed a being — or DAXNI’s own plug-in door — instructions hidden inside a record, a message, or a tool result, so the being hands over its key, signs something it never meant to sign, or acts on an attacker’s orders. Or replay a challenge so a stolen signature works twice.

Today What DAXNI does about it

Planned What is still to come

What this page does not cover

Abuse of the registry — squatting, impersonation, spam — and what DAXNI does when a being misbehaves is on the security page under Registry abuse. What happens if DAXNI itself disappears is on the governance page. Witness rules are on the witnesses page. If you find a hole in any of this, the disclosure contact is in security.txt.